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1 Introduction 
Sales promotions are techniques that stimulate consumers to purchase from 
a specific retail store or to try a particular product. Several methods are 
used by firms to promote their sales: price promotions, demonstrations, free 
samples, premiums, point-of-sale displays, etc. Price promotions are typically 
temporary price discounts offered by firms from time to time. Coupons, shelf-
price reductions, and mail-in rebates are the usual marketing devices through 
which sellers carry out their price promotions. Most of the reports indicate 
that coupons are extensively used as a sales promotion tool1 . For instance, 
Strazewski (1986) reports that 95 % of US sellers have used coupons to pro-
mote their sales in 1984. A coupon is a certificate that entitles the holder to 
redeem its value for money or, occasionally, goods. Coupons are distributed 
through several ways: free-standing inserts (FSIs), print advertising, direct 
mailing, on or inside the packages, and in stores. 
Recently, the industrial organization literature has offered three alter-
native explanations of the role of coupons. First, coupons can be used to 
induce repeated purchases. A seller, by offering Cl coupon to those consumers 
that purchase from his store in the first period, can endogenously create a 
future switching cost. Thus, consumers have less incentives to switch stores 
in the second period. As a result, coupons decrease competition.2 Second, 
coupons can be used as a retailer stimulation mechanism. If a product is 
sold through a distribution channel, the manufacturer may directly send out 
coupons to the consumers to motivate retail participation in the promotion. 3 
Third, coupons can serve as a price discrimination device. Sellers, by send-
ing out coupons at distant locations, can induce consumers to switch stores. 
Contrary to the first case, competition is now fostered. 4 
An important role of the coupons has however been ignored by the litera-
ture, namely that they may convey price information as well. To address this 
issue, we study sales promotions through coupons in an oligopoly under im-
lSellers use coupons to stimulate consumers to try a new or an established product, to 
increase sales volume quickly, to attract repeated purchases or to introduce new package 
sizes or features. 
2Banerjee and Summers (1987) develop a two period model with homogeneous products 
where in the first period firms offer discounts granted to the first period buyers if they 
repeat their purchases. In their model coupons become a collusive device. Both period 
equilibrium prices are found to coincide with the monopoly price. Caminal and Matutes 
(1990) study coupons in a two period differentiated product duopoly. Competition is again 
found to be relaxed through the use of coupons. 
3Gerstner and Hess (1991) consider that this fact can explain why rebates are offered 
even when all consumers use them and price discrimination does not occur. 
4See Narasimhan (1984), Caminal (1996) and Bester and Petrakis (1996). 
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perfect price information. We consider a segmented market where consumers 
incur transportation costs to venture a distant location, and thus only local 
price information is costlessly available to them. 5 Interestingly, in our analy-
sis market segmentation is not only locational but also informational. If 
sellers do not advertise their prices, consumers have to travel to find out 
the price charged by the distant store. In this situation, sellers can attract 
consumers from the rival's location by either advertising the price and/or of-
fering rebates. For this purpose, firms can issue two kinds of coupons: first, 
coupons that offer at the same time a rebate and communicate the regular 
price and second, coupons that only offer a rebate. We call them coupons 
communicating the price (CCPs) and coupons not communicating the price 
(CNCPs) , respectively. Both types of coupons serve as a price discrimina-
tion device and thus fit into the third cat.egory described above. However, 
CCPs convey also price information. Interest.ingly, promoting sales through 
either CCPs or CNCPs leads to different informational structures and thus 
market equilibria. Issuing and sending out coupons is a costly activit.y. Since 
printing the price on a coupon does not represent an extra cost, we assume 
that CCPs and CNCPs are equally costly. 
VYe first study optimal pricing, rebating and advertising intensit.y in a 
market where sellers can promote their sales by sending out only CCPs. 
Sellers, by simultaneously providing price information and practising price 
discrimination, may gain consumers from other locations and thus increase 
their market shares. Due to this twofold role of CCPs, our work is linked 
to two strands of the literature: that on informativE- advertising and that 
on coupons as a price discrimination device. Contrary to the bulk of the 
informative advertising literature, we assume that all consumers are well in-
formed about the existence, availability and characteristics of the products; 
only price information is imperfect.6 This is in line wit.h Bester and Petrakis 
(1995) where pure price advertising is studied in a price competition model. 
Our model is however more general since a CCP offering a zero rebate is 
nothing else than a pure price ad. On the other hand, Caminal (1996) and 
Bester and Petrakis (1996) show that coupons act as price discrimination 
devices in equilibrium. Caminal (1996) considers a monopolist facing hetero-
geneous consumers and uncertain marginal costs. Bester and Petrakis (1996) 
5From now on, the market segmentation is referred as locational but the analysis also 
applies to e.g. market segmentation due to consumers' brand loyalty. 
6See e.g. Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Tirole (1989) and Stegeman 
(1991). In most of the papers on informative advertising, sellers are able to attract con-
sumers by informing them about the existence of their products. Here, in contrast, sellers 
can attract consumers only by advertising a lower price or by offering a rebate because 
consumers are fully informed about the existence and availability of the products. 
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study a duopoly where consumers have perfect price information. Due to the 
locational segmentation however, our assumption that consumers have only 
local price information seems more reasonable. 
We show that there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium with 
rational expectations where sellers send out CCPs to the distant location 
offering positive rebates. Contrary to the literature, this finding implies that 
in a (finitely) repeated market interaction between sellers, under imperfect 
price information sales promotions are permanent. For instance, in Bester 
and Petrakis (1995) a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which both 
firms advertise their prices fails to exist. The reason is that each individ-
ual seller can gain by advertising his price only if he offers a lower price 
than his competitor's. Obviously, this condition cannot be simultaneously 
fulfilled for all sellers in a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. As a result, 
price promotions can only occur in a mixed strategy equilibrium which, in 
a dynamic interpretation, generates temporal price dispersion (as each store 
varies its price over time). This is also in line with Shilony (1977), Varian 
(1980) and Narasimhan (1988). In our model however, sellers by offering 
rebates through coupons can simultaneously announce lower prices than the 
undiscounted rivals' prices in a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Hence, 
price promotions are permanent here. Note that, not only the regular price 
is permanently advertised, but also discounts are permanently offered. 
Second, we study the sellers' optimal strategy when they can send out 
only CNCPs. Again, a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium with rational 
e."Xpectations is shown to exist. Even though firms cannot advertise their 
prices, they still send out coupons that offer positive rebates in equilibrium. 
Hence, price promotions are permanent here as well. Not surprisingly, the 
higher is the difficulty to propagate information in the industry, the higher 
are equilibrium prices, advertising efforts and sellers' profits. In fact, the 
equilibrium with CNCPs involves higher prices, advertising efforts and typ-
ically firms profits than the equilibrium with CCPs. Analogously, in the 
equilibrium with CCPs prices, advertising efforts and commonly sellers prof-
its are higher than those under the perfect price information equilibrium of 
Bester and Petrakis (1996). 
We finally study the robustness of the equilibria with CCPs and CNCPs 
when firms are allowed to select the type of coupons as well. We show that 
the equilibrium with CNCPs is no longer an equilibrium when firms can send 
out CCPs. Contrarily, the equilibrium with CCPs is always robust to sellers' 
deviations to send out CNCPs. The implication is then that CNCPs should 
not be observed in this kind of markets. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the model. Section 3 provides a characterization of the equilibrium with 
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CCPs and sufficient conditions for its existence. In section 4 we study the 
equilibrium with CNCPs. The robustness of the equilibria is analyzed in 
section 5. Section 6 contains comparative statics and welfare results. Section 
7 concludes. Finally, an appendix contains all the proofs. 
2 The model 
Following Bester and Petrakis (1996), we consider an industry with two firms, 
A and B, located at different regions. Firms produce a homogeneous good 
at zero cost. The neighborhood of each firm is inhabited by a unit mass of 
consumers who have unit.ary demands for the good and a common reserva-
tion utility v > O. Each consumer can costlessly visit the store at his home 
location. However, consumer i has to pay a transportat.ion cost Si 2: 0 to 
visit the distant store, where Si is uniformly distributed on [0, sJ across the 
population in each region. Consumer i's transportation cost is assurned to 
be unobservable7 . Further, to avoid local monopolies, we assume that v > s, 
i.e. transportation costs are not too high. 
Consumers are aware of the existence, characteristics and availability of 
the goods. Also, they can costlessly learn the local price by visiting the 
store at their home location. However, they are not informed about the price 
charged at the distant location. Consumers are able to obtain this price in-
formation either by visiting the dist.ant store at some cost, or if the dist.ant 
store advertises its price. Firms can thus promote their sales by sending 
out coupons at their rivals' regions. Under our imperfect price information 
regime, sellers can issue two types of coupons: (i) coupons offering a rebate 
and also posting the price of the good (Coupons Communicating the Price 
(CCPs)), and (ii) coupons offering only a rebate (Coupons Not Comrrmnicat-
ing the Price (CNCPs)). Both types of coupons serve as a price discrimina-
tion deviceS as sellers can charge different prices to consumers from different 
locations. CCPs also serve as a price information vehicle9 as firms are able 
to advertise their prices to the distant locations. Note that a CCP offering a 
zero rebate can be considered as pure price advertising. 
Formally, seller i can send out coupons to a fraction Ai E [0,1 J of the 
population at location jIO, offering them a rebate ri on its regular price Pi; 
7Under this assumption firms cannot practise perfect price discrimination. Also, there 
is no arbitrage between consumers in the same region. 
sas in Bester and Petrakis (1996) and Caminal (1996). 
gas in Bester and Petrakis (1995) 
IONote that, in our model sellers by distributing coupons to their home locations canllot 
increase their profits. 
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o ::; ri ::; Pi, i = A, B. Without loss of generality, let 0 ::; Pi ::; V, i = 
A, B. Since individual transportation costs are unobservable, Ai represents 
the probability with which a consumer in region j receives a coupon. A 
consumer then who has received a coupon has to pay Pi - ri for firm i's 
good, while those who have not received a coupon have to pay Pi. To reach a 
fraction of consumers Ai, seller i incurs at a cost. k(Ai), where k(.) is assumed 
to be increasing and convex and satisfy k(O) = 011 . These assumptions on 
the cost function are standard in the literature (see e.g. Butters (1977), 
Grossman and Shapiro (1984), and Bester and Pet.rakis (1995, 1996)). 
3 The equilibrium with CCPs. 
In t.his section sellers are allowed to send out only coupons that post the 
regular price of the good. We assume that firms compete by simultaneously 
choosing their prices, rebates and intensity of couponing. Then firm i chooses 
its marketing strategy, (Pi, ri, Ai), to maximize its profits taking as given its 
rival's marketing strategy, (Pj,Tj,Aj),i,j = A, B. To find firm i's profits we 
need first to determine its demand. Note that the above strategies define 
four different groups of consumers: first, those located at A receiving a CCP 
from firm B; second, those located at A not Teceiving a CCP from B; third, 
those located at B receiving a CCP from A; and fourth, those located at B 
not receiving a CCP from A. 
First, a consumer located at A who receives a coupon learns both, firm 
B's regular price and the rebate he will obtain if he purchases the good 
from that firm. Thus, he buys the good from his home location whenever 
PA ::; PB - rB + 5 and v 2: PA· Second, consider a consumer located at A not 
receiving a coupon from firm B. He purchases from his home location as long 
as PA :s: P'1 + 5 and v 2: PA, where P'1 is the price he expects to be charged 
at location B. Third, a consumer located at B who receives a coupon from 
A learns the price charged and the rebate offered by firm A. He will switch 
store and purchase from A if and only if PA - TA + 5 :s: P B and v 2: PA - TA + 5. 
Finally, a consumer located at B who does not receive a coupon buys from 
firm A if p~ + 5 :s: PB and v 2: PA + 5, where PA is the price he expects to be 
charged at location A. Since all consumers purchasing from firm A have to 
pay a price PA except those receiving a coupon who only pay (PA - 'l'A) for 
the good, the firm A's profits function is given by: 
11 Note that it is implicitly assumed that sending out CCPs or CNCPs are equally costly 
activities, This is reasonable since printing the price on a CNCP does not represent an 
extra cost, 
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+(PA - l' A)AA max {o, min {PB - (~ - TA), V - (p~ - TA), I} } - k(AA)' 
(1) 
By the symmetry of the problem, firm B's profits are given by an anal-
ogous expression. We shall restrict attention to symmetric solutions alone. 
Particularly, the solution concept used here is the symmetric pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium with rational expectations. 
Definition 1 A symmetric pure strategy Nasft equilib'rium with rational ex-
pectations is a pair of marketing strategies (P:4, TA : A:1 ), (PE' 7'E' A ~) satisJy-
zng: 
(i) ITi(p;,pj,r;,rj,A;,Aj) ~ ITi(Pi,Pj,Ti,Tj,Ai,Aj) for all 
(Pi,ri,Ad =I (p;,r;,An, i =I j, i, j = A, B. 
( ") * * * *' * '* ZZ PA = PB, rA = TB' AA = AB' 
(iii) pf = P:, i = A, B. 
Condition (i) says that each marketing strategy is a best reply to the 
other. Condition (ii) imposes symmetry. Finally, condition (iii) requires 
consumers' price expectations to be fulfilled in equilibrium. From now on, 
we denote this symmetric equilibrium by the vector (p, 1', A). The follow-
ing proposition characterizes the interior equilibrium with CCPs and also 
provides conditions for its existence. 
Proposition 1 If sellers promote their sales by only sending out CCPs, a 
unique interior symmetric pure strategy equilibrium with rational expectations 
exists if and only if (a) k'(l) > 8/9 and (b) k'(28/3v) < v 2 /48. Such equi-




r = O.5p 
2 ~S = k' (>.) 
(3) 
(4) 
The equilibrium price and "advertising" intensity are shown in Figure 
1. The downwards slopping line PP depicts equation (2) and the upwards 
slopping line J{ J{ depicts equation (4). The intersection of these two lines 
provides the equilibrium price and advertising intensity (point E). The role 
of the conditions ( a) and (b) that guarantee an interior solution can be easily 
seen in Figure 1. If, on the contrary, the marginal cost of sending coupons 
to all the consumers at the rival's region were sufficiently low, sellers would 
optimally set>. * = 1; if, on the other hand, the marginal cost were rela-
tively high even for small advertising intensities, sellers could safely charge 
a regular price equal to the consumers' valuation in order to appropriate all 
the home consumers' surplus (with or without sending out coupons to the 
distant location). 
<insert figure 1 here> 
In equilibrium the rebate is strictly positive and, in particular, equals half 
the regular price. As a coupon offering zero rebate is equivalent to pure price 
advertising in our model, proposition 1 predicts that pure price advertising 
should not be observed in a locationally segmented market. However, one 
might argue that handling coupons generates extra costs for the seller, and 
thus pure price advertising is a significantly cheaper sales promotion activity 
than sending out coupons12 . Let, for the moment, consider an extended 
model where firms can send out both pure price ads and coupons. Assume 
that sales promotion costs are given by k(>. + Ojl), where jl is the price ads 
intensity and 8 :::; 1. That is, a seller incurs the same costs by choosing a 
couponing intensity>. and a higher price advertisements intensity of (1/0)>.. 
Note first that price ads and coupons cannot coexist in a symmetric pure 
strategy equilibrium. The intuition is simply that by advertising its price, a 
seller can attract consumers from the distant location only if he offers a lower 
price than his rival's. This however cannot happen simultaneously for all 
the sellers in a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (see Bester and Petrakis 
(1995)). Further, it can be shown that if price advertising is sufficiently 
cheaper than coupons ({) close to zero), then an individual seller has an 
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium in Proposition 1. He will certainly 
gain by lowering its price and advertising extensively its lower price at almost 
12See e.g. Caminal (1996) 
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no cost. Hence, if b is sufficiently small, the equilibrium with CCPs of our 
model cannot be sustained as an equilibrium in the extended model. 
Proposition 1 further predicts that sales promotions are permanent when-
ever price information is imperfect. This is due to the existence of a pure 
strategy equilibrium where firms promote their sales by sending out coupons 
every period. This is in sharp contrast with the existing literature where 
sales are temporary13. All these models generate temporal price dispersion 
in the sense that each store varies its price over time. As a pure strategy 
equilibrium does not exist, sellers can only advertise their prices with some 
probability in equilibrium. 
4 The equilibrium with CNCPs. 
Let us assume now that sellers can promote their sales by sending out only 
CNCPs. Again, we first determine seller A's demand. As previously, four 
different groups of consumers can be distinguished: first, those located at 
A receiving a CNCP from firm B; second, those located at A not receiving 
a CNCP from B; third, those located at B r'ccciving a CNCP from A; and 
fourt.h, those located at. B not receiving a CNCP from A. Contrary to the 
previous case, a consumer located at A receiving a coupon from firm B only 
learns the rebate offered from that firm. Thus, he buys the good from his 
home location whenever PA ~ p~ - 1'B + s and v 2:: PA, with p~ the price he 
expects to be charged at location B. A consumer located at A not receiving a 
coupon from firm B purchase from his home location as long as PA ~ p~ + s 
and v 2:: PA. Analogously, a consumer located at B who has received a coupon 
from A only learns the rebate offered by firm A. He switches store and buys 
from firm A if and only if PA - TA + S ~ PB and v 2:: PA - r A + s. Finally, 
a consumer located at B who has not received a conpon from A bnys from 
firm A if PA + S ~ PB and v 2:: PA + s. Firm A's profits are then given by: 
{ . {P B - P4 v - P4 } } +PA(1- AA)max O,mm s', s', 1 + 
13See Shilony (1977), Butters (1977), Varian (1980), Narasimhan (1988), Stahl (1994) 
and Bester and Petrakis (1995) 
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+(PA - rA)AAmax {o,min {PB - (~A -1'A), v - (p; - rA ), I}} - k(AA), 
(5) 
Firm B's profits are analogous, The following proposition characterizes 
the equilibrium in case that firms can promote their sales using CNCPs alone: 
Proposition 2 Whenever sellers can promote their sales by sending out only 
CNCPs, a unique interior symmetric pure strategy equilibrium with rational 
expectations exists if and only if k' (1) > 8/4, and k' (8/ v) < v2 /48. This 
equilibrium is given by the solution to the following system of equations (6)-
(8): 
8 (6) P= -A 
r = a.sp (7) 
2 ~8 = k'(A) (8) 
In Figure 1 the equilibrium price and couponing intensity are given by 
the intersection of curves P' P' and J{ J{ (point E'). Equation (6) is depicted 
in the line P' pI, while equation (8) (which is the same as equation (4)) is 
given by K K. Note that the line P' pI lies entirely above the line PP. The 
interpretation of the conditions that guarantee an interior solution is similar 
to that of the previous section. 
The equilibrium with CNCPs has similar properties with the equilib-
rium with CCPs. First, sellers always offer strictly positive discounts to the 
consumers located at the rival's region by sending out a positive amount 
of CNCPs. Second, the rebate equals half the regular price. Finally, sales 
promotions are not temporary since coupons offering rebates are distributed 
every period. All these then reinforce our conclusions of the previous section. 
It is interesting now to compare our results of Propositions 1 and 2 with 
those under perfect price information, as in Bester and Petrakis (1996). The 
equilibrium under perfect price information is characterized by three equa-
tions (their Proposition 1). Their last two equations coincide with the cor-
responding equations of both our equilibrium with CCPs and with CNCPs. 
The only difference lies in the first equation: under perfect price informa-
tion, the equilibrium price has to satisfy P = 8/(1 + a.SA), while under CCPs 
satisfies equation (2) and under CNCPs equation (6). This is shown in Fig-
ure 1 where the line K K is common in all cases, and P" P" depicts the first 
equation of Bester and Petrakis (1996). Point E' in Figure 1 then gives the 
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equilibrium price and advertising intensity under perfect price information. 
Note further that P" P" lies entirely below PP. 
Interestingly, the optimal rebate equals half the regular price (1' = O.5p) 
under both imperfect and perfect price information. In all these cases, l' is 
chosen to maximize the seller's profits from those consumers who receive a 
coupon. Since CCPs also convey price information, this part of the profit 
maximization problem in Proposition 1 is the same as in Bester and Petrakis 
(1996). On the other hand, a consumer receiving a CNCP does not learn the 
regular price of the good. Then the optimal discount equals half the expected 
regular price, which however, under the rational expectations hypothesis, 
coincides with the regular price. 
Further, we observe from Figure 1 that equilibrium prices and sales pro-
motion intensity are higher whenever price information is imperfect (E' lies to 
the south,vest of both E and E'). Obviously, imperfect information reduces 
price competition. Thus, firms can send out coupons to a higher percentage 
of consumers at the distant location without having to substantially cut their 
regular prices. It is worth stressing here that the price differential between 
the equilibrium ,vith CCPs and the equilibrium under perfect information 
reduces as the marginal costs of couponing decrease (As k'(>') decreases, the 
line [{[{shifts to the right in Figure 1). Firms, facing now lower marginal 
costs, are able to send out CCPs to a higher fraction of consumers, thus 
increasing the information level in the market. In fact, if the marginal costs 
of couponing are sufficiently low, the equilibrium with CCPs converges to 
that under perfect information. On the other hand, the equilibrium with 
CNCPs involves higher prices and advertising intensity than the equilibrium 
with CCPs (E lies to the southwest of E'). The int.uition is that fi.rms, by 
using CCPs instead of CNCPs, spread out at. the same t.ime price information 
into the market, and as a result face a stronger price competition. To avoid 
then a substantial cut of his regular price, a seller optimally reduces his sales 
promotion intensity. 
Finally, we compare sellers profits in the above three equilibria. Our pre-
vious discussion reveals that advertising costs are higher in equilibrium under 
CNCPs than under CCPs, and the latter are higher than under perfect price 
information. The same is true for both the regular prices and the rebates, 
while the opposite holds for advertising intensities. As a result, sellers rev-
enues (and hence profits) are not easily comparable across equilibria. As the 
following proposition however establishes, equilibrium profits are the highest 
under CNCPs, followed by those under CCPs and the lowest under perfect 
price information for a common in the literature family of cost functions. 
Proposition 3 If k (>.) = 1n>' 0:, ex ~ 3, then eq'U'ihbr''iwn profits an; higher-
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under CNCPs than under CC Ps, and those are higher than under perfect 
price information. 
The intuition is that as the information available in the market increases, 
sellers face stronger price competition, and thus typically obtain lower profits. 
Note however, that as the market becomes more informed, there is also less 
need to spend on price ads. Finally, the equilibrium profits under CCPs 
tend to those under perfect information for sufficiently small marginal costs 
of advertising, while the equilibrium profits under CNCPs are always higher 
than under CCPs. 
5 Robustness of the Equilibria with CCPs 
and with CNCPs. 
So far we have assumed that sellers can promote their sales either by sending 
out cCPs or CNCPs. Proposition 3 says that when sellers send out CNCPs 
typically obtain higher profits than when they send out CCPs. A seller is 
however free to respond to his rival's marketing strategy by issuing anyone 
of these two types of coupons, or even by issuing both types at the same 
moment. Under this light, it is reasonable to ask ourselves: Do the equilibria 
with CNCPs and CCPs survive if sellers can choose the type (or the mix of 
types) of coupons they issue to promote their sales as well? 
We first examine the robustness of the equilibrium with CNCPs. Assum-
ing that his rival follO\vs the equilibrium marketing strategy (Proposition 
2), does a seller have an incentive to deviate and send out CCPs instead of 
CNCPs? Obviously, a seller can gain by such a deviation only if he charges a 
regular price lower than the equilibrium price. (By charging and communi-
cating a higher price, he is unable to attract additional consumers). It turns 
out that if the seller substitutes all CNCPs with CCPs, and adjusts properly 
his regular price and rebate, he can always increase his profits. Therefore, as 
the proposition 4 states, the equilibrium with CNCPs is never robust. 
Proposition 4 The equilibrium with CNCPs is no longer an equilibrium iJ 
sellers are allowed to choose the type oJ coupons they issue to promote their 
sales. 
The intuition is that sellers find themselves in a Prisoners' Dilemma. 
Both sellers would earn higher profits if they could only send out CNCPs. 
However, an individual seller, by lowering his price and informing consumers 
at the rival's location about this reduction, is able to attract more customers 
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and thus increase his profits. Of course, this can be achieved by sending out 
CCPs instead of CNCPs. 
We next study the robustness of the equilibrium with CCPs. Assuming 
that his rival follows the equilibrium marketing strategy (Proposition 1), does 
a seller have an incentive to deviate by sending out some CNCPs as well? 
Obviously, such a deviation can only be profitable if the seller raises his 
regular price. Let PA (> p) be the regular price charged by the deviating seller 
A. Let r A be the rebate offered by a CCP, and rA the rebate on a CNCP. When 
studying the profitability of such a deviation one however has to be careful 
about the out of equilibrium expectations of those consumers receiving a 
CNCP, P'A. This is because consumers expect in equilibrium to receive either 
a coupon communicating the price or nothing at all. Some consumers, to 
their surprise, receive coupons not communicating the regular price and also 
offering a rebate different than the equilibrium rebate. Rational consumers, 
however, know that a deviating seller A will set it.s rebate on the CNCPs in an 
optimal way, for any regular price chosen. Hence, t.hose consumers observing 
a rebate that do not expect on a coupon which does not communicate the 
price, should infer that seller A deviates by sending CNCPs. Moreover, t.hey 
should form out of equilibrium beliefs which are rational, that is PA = PA· 
In fact, these expectations are the only "consistent" beliefs based on t.heir 
information: A consumer in region B receiving Cl CNCP observes <41 knows 
the equilibrium price p, and also knows that. seller A will set optimally its 
regular price PA1taking consumers expectations P~1 as given, such that 7'~ = 
O.5(PA + P~4 - p) (from the f.o.c. of (27) with respect to r~). Conducting 
then a simple thought experiment., this consumer should be able to infer t.he 
only price of seller A which is consist.ent with his beliefs (s(:''C also footnote 
(19)). This, in turn, implies that consumers receiving a CNCP behave in 
the same way as consumers receiving a CCP. Hence, if seller A did not. have 
an incentive to deviate by raising his price in the equilibrium with CCPs, 
he does not have an incentive either to increase its price when sending out 
CNCPs as well. Therefore, this deviation cannot be profitable. 14 
Proposition 5 The equilibrium with CCPs remains robust when selleTs are 
also able to choose the type of coupons they use to promote their sales. 
14This result also holds for other out of equilibrium expectations. For installce, the 
equilibrium with CCPs is robust if consumers receiving a Cl'\CP are rather "pessimistic" 1 
i.e. they believe that seller A charges the equilibrium price ullder CNCPs. On tile other 
hand, if these consumers are "optimistic", i.e. they believe that seller A did not print 
the price on the coupon by mistake (even after observing a different than the equilibrium 
rebate), then the equilibrium with CCPs is rob list IInder mild convexity conditions on the 
advertising cost function. 
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In summary, since the equilibrium with CNCPs is not robust when sellers 
can send out CCPs, while the equilibrium with CCPs is found to be robust 
to the introduction of CNCPs, our model predicts that CNCPs should not 
be observed in locationally-informationally segmented markets. 
6 Comparative statics. 
Figure'l allow us to derive some comparative statics results for the robust 
equilibrium with CCPS15. We first study how an increase in the degree of 
product differentiation affects the equilibrium outcome. Product differenti-
ation in our model is related to transportations costs. An increase in the 
transportation costs, s, shifts the PP schedule to the right and the f{ f{ 
schedule to the left in Figure 1. As a result, the equilibrium price is un-
ambiguously raised. This is well known in the literature on product differ-
entiation: competition can be rela.xed through product differentiation (see 
Shaked and Sutton (1982)). The equilibrium couponing intensity increases 
with the degree of product differentiation, too. By substituting equation (2) 
into equation (4) we obtain that A has to satisfy s = 9A2k'(A), and thus A 
increases with s (since k"(A) > 0). The equilibrium redemption rate, how-
ever, decreases with the degree of product. differentiation. Since only those 
consumers whose transportation costs are less or equal than the rebate l' will 
redeem their coupons, the redemption rat.e equals t.o r/s = p/2s = 1/3A 16. 
Therefore, although more consumers receive a coupon, a smaller pen;entage 
of them redeems it. 
Finally, equilibrium profits are equal to IT = p- Ap2 /4s-k(A) = 5Ak'(A)-
k(A) (as p = 6Ak'(A) if we substitute (2) into (4) and also using (4)). Since 
advertising intensity increases with the degree of product differentiation and 
8IT/8A = 4k'(A) + 5Ak"(A) > 0, we conclude t.hat. sellers profits are larger, 
the larger is the degree of product different.iation. The intuition is as follows. 
As s increases, it becomes more difficult to attract consumers from the dis-
tant location. Then competition becomes softer and firms can charge higher 
prices. On the other hand, firms have to increase their advertising efforts to 
motivate consumers to switch stores. Contrarily to the first effect, the latter 
fosters competition. However, the first effect dominates the second and, as a 
result, sellers profits increase. 
Next, we study how an increase in the marginal costs of advertising affects 
l5Note that similar comparative statics results can be obtained for the non-robust equi-
librium with CNCPs. 
l6 Note that such redemption rate is well defined if ,\ * E [t, 1) . This fact is guaranteed 
if we assume that 2:5 > v. 
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the equilibrium outcome. An increase in the marginal costs, k' (>..), shifts the 
K K schedule to the left, while the PP schedule remains unchanged (Fig-
ure 1). This unambiguously raises the equilibrium price and decreases the 
advertising intensity. In fact, if the marginal costs of advertising are pro-
hibitively high, coupons will not be issued at all, and sellers can extract all 
the local consumers surplus by charging their monopoly price v17. Further, 
the equilibrium redemption rate increases with the marginal costs of coupon-
ing. Even though less coupons are send out, a higher percentage of them is 
redeemed because they offer a higher rebate. Finally, to study the effects of 
an increase in the marginal costs of advertising on sellers' profits, we consider 
the family of costs functions k(>..) = mX:r, Cl; 2: 3. Our model confirms the 
well-known result in the informative advertising literat.ure: Seller's profits 
are higher \vhen the marginal costs of couponing are higher1S.\iVhile an in-
crease in the marginal costs, and thus in the costs of couponing, has a direct. 
negative effect on profits, there is also a positive strat.egic effect: sellers re-
duce their advertising intensity and, as a result, competition is rela.'(ed. The 
strategic effect dominates the direct. effect, and thus sellers profits increase 
when couponing becomes more expensive. Thns, in line with the literature, 
sellers prefer advertising t.o be illegal in our model, too. 
The following proposition summarizes om comparative statics results: 
Proposition 6 a) As the degree of product differentiation increa.ses, equilib-
rium prices, rebates, advertis'ing intensity and sellers' profits increase, 'While 
equilibrium redemption rates decrease. b) As the nW.Tginal cost of couponing 
increases, equilibrium prices, rebates and nAemplion rates increase, 'While 
equilibrium advertising intensity decreases. F'uTlhC1', equilibrium pmIits m-
crea.se with m if the couponing co.st . .s aTe k(A) = 'm,A Ct 1 (): 2': 3. 
Finally, it is int.eresting to provide some welfare results for th(~ equi-
librium with CCPs. Total welfare is defined as the (umveighted) sum of 
consumer surplus and sellers profits. Since all consumers buy in equilibrium 
and production costs are zero, it is easy to see t.hat tot.al welfare is equal to 
gross consumer surplus minus sales promotion costs, i.e. STV = 2(v - k(>..)). 
Thus, (net) consumer surplus can be attained by subtracting sellers' profit.s 
(10)..k'(>'') - 2k(>")) from the total welfare, i.e.: 
cs = 2v - 10>..k'(>..) = 2v - 108/9>.. (9) 
17This is similar to Bester and Petrakis (1995) where if the adyertising costs are suffi-
ciently high, firms do not advertise at all and set their local monopoly price in equilibrium. 
18See Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Peters (1984), Tirole (1989) and Bester and Pe-
trakis (1995). 
14 
(since by (2) and (4), >.k'(>') = s/9>.). Both consumer surplus and total wel-
fare decrease with the degree of product differentiation, as equilibrium>. in-
creases with s. Since sales promotion costs are socially wasteful in our model, 
total welfare is higher when sellers spend less on advertising. Consumers 
surplus is also decreasing in s, because the higher is the degree of product 
differentiation, the softer is the competition between firms and the higher 
are the prices charged. On the other hand, as marginal costs of couponing 
increase, consumer surplus decreases. Sellers not only charge higher prices 
now, but also send a smaller number of coupons to the distant location. Fi-
nally, to study how an increase in the marginal cost of couponing affects total 
welfare, we again consider the family of cost functions k(>.) = m>'Ct, ex ;::: 3. 
Proposition 7 summarizes the welfare results: 
Proposition 7 a) Equilibrium consurner surplus and total welfare are de-
creasing with the degree of product difJe'rentiation. b) Equilibrium consumer 
surplus decreases as the marginal cost of couponing increases. Further', total 
welfare decrease with m, if the adverl.ising costs a're of the type k(>') = m.>.Ct, 
ex;::: 3. 
As both the marginal and the total costs of sales promotion increase, t.here 
is a direct negative effect on total welfare, and an indirect positive effect 
due to a less intense sales promotion activity. The direct effect, however, 
dominates and total welfare decreases with the parameter m. 
7 Summary and conclusions 
In a locationally segmented market, it is reasonable to assume that. price 
information is imperfect in the sense that consurners can costlessly observe 
only the prices charged at their home location. To learn, however, the price 
at the distant location, they must either venture the distant location and 
thus incur a transportation cost, or receive price ads from the distant seller. 
In this market, coupons may enable sellers to compete for buyers at distant 
locations. 
In this paper we have studied coupons as a sales promotions activity. 
Since the market is informationally segmented, two types of coupons can 
be issued at equal costs: (a) coupons communicating the price (CCPs) and 
(b) coupons not communicating the price (CNCPs). CCPs not only offer a 
rebate, but also convey price information, while CNCPs only offer a rebate. 
Then a CCP offering a zero rebate is equivalent to pure price advertising. 
'Ve have characterized the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibria where 
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sellers can send out only CCPs, or only CNCPs, and we have provided con-
ditions for the existence of interior equilibria. In both equilibria with CCPs 
and CNCPs, sellers always offer positive rebates (equal to half the regu-
lar price) and send out a positive amount of coupons. The existence of a 
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium implies that, contrary to the literature, 
price promotions are permanent here. Further, sellers advertise their prices 
by sending out CCPs, which implies that pure price advertising should not 
be observed in a locationally segmented market (provided that pure price 
advertising and couponing costs are of similar magnitude) 
Since CNCPs only offer a rebate, they do not. spread price information. As 
a result, equilibrium prices, advertising efforts and sellers profits are higher 
in the equilibrium with CNCPs than \V"ith t.he CCPs. Thus, sellers would 
be better off if they could only send out. CNCPs. However, the eqnilibrium 
\vith CNCPs is not robust.. '\Then sellers are allowed to choose the type 
of coupons to issue as well, they have always an incentive to deviate from 
their marketing strategy in the "equilibrium" with CNCPs and send out 
CCPs instead of CNCPs. In fact, sellers fonnd themselves into a Prisoners' 
Dilemma situation. In contrast, the equilibrium with CCPs has been shown 
to be always robust. Thus, our model prerticts that price discrimination 
should take place by sending out CCPs instead of CNCPs whenever price 
information is imperfect in a location ally segrnent.ed market. 
CNCPs are however observed in many markets. One might argue t.hat. 
the reason is that sellers are colluding in an infinitely repeated market in-
teraction. However, this does not seem to be a reasonable explanation, as if 
sellers were able to collude in order to avoid CCPs, they must also be able 
to collude to avoid coupons whatsoever. In the latter case, sellers are local 
monopolists and thus attain the highest possible profits. Another argument 
might be that sellers use CNCPs because consumers have perfect price in-
formation as in Bester and Petrakis (1996). Hmvever, as we argued above, 
this does not seem too plausible in locationally segment.ed markets. Some al-
ternative explanation is thus needed to accommodate this observation. One 
could introduce some asymmetries into our model. For instance, allowing 
for different consumers willingness to pay for the good sold in each location, 
or for different transportation costs, one might obtain richer optimal sell-
ers marketing strategies. Another possibility would be to build an extended 
model with vertical market relations and study whether manufacturers or 
retailers have incentives to promote their sales and which type of coupons is 
more likely to be send out from each of the part.ies. 
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 1: We first claim that an interior equilibrium has to 
satisfy equations (2) -(4). Assume, for the moment, that consumers not 
getting a coupon believe that the price charged at the distant location is 
not lower than that at their home location, i.e. pj ~ Pi; also that Pi ~ 
(Pi -ri), i,j = A, B. We shall later show that these assumptions are satisfied 
in equilibrium. Then firm A's decision problem is: (by symmetry, firm B's 
decision problem is analogous): 
(10) 
First order conditions are given by the following three equations: 
Imposing symmetry, that is, PA = PB = p*, 1'A = 1'B = 1'*, and AA = AB = 
A *, and using the rational expectations hypothesis, that is, P'A = PA, PB = P B, 
we obtain the system of equations (2)-(4). Not.e that all the assumptions 
made above are satisfied in equilibrium. In fact, PB ~ PA, P'A ~ PB, PA ~ 
PB - rB and PB ~ PA - 7'A· Moreover, it can be checked that the second order 
conditions are satisfied. 
Next, we show that the system of equations (2)-(4) has a unique interior 
solution if and only if k'(l) > 8/9 and k'(28/3v) < v2/48. Equation (2) 
defines Pl(A) = 28/3A with p~(A) < 0, Pl(O) = 00 and PI(l) = 28/3 (PP 
curve in Figure 1). Equation (4) defines P2(A) = (4sk'(A))O.5, with p~(A) > 0, 
P2(0) < 00 and P2(1) = (4sk'(1))o.5 (I{I< curve in Figure 1). From Figure 
1 it can be checked that PI (A) and P2 (A) intersect at an interior point such 
that P::; v if and only if k'(l) > 8/9 and k'(28/3v) < v2/48. 
Finally, we claim that no firm has an incentive to deviate from the pro-
posed equilibrium. Assume that firm B follows the equilibrium strategy 
(p, 1', A). Note that if firm A deviates by changing its strategy, consumers not 
receiving a coupon at location B will still remain uninformed about A's price 
and thus have no reason to change their expectations. Of course, uninformed 
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consumers at location A have no reason either to change their expectations. 
We first check whether firm A has an incentive to use an alternative strategy 
consisting of lmvering its price t.ogether with some rebate and advertising 
effort. 
There are two cases to consider. First, profits from a deviation such that 
O.5p ::; PA ::; P are given by: 
(14) 
Since these profits are the same as t.hose of equation (10), it is obvious t.hat 
firm A cannot gain by charging PA. Second, if firm A charges PA < O.5p 
obtains profits: 
n A = PA + AA(PA - TA)(P - (PA - 'l"A))/8 - k(AA) (15) 
The first order condition UnA/ urA = 0 implies t hat firm A would optimally 
set (PA - TA) = O.5p. Using t.his, the first order condition unA/DA;\. = 0 
reduces to p2/48 = k'(AA). Therefore, firm A \vould optimally choose AA = A. 
To complete the argument, note that DnA/uPA = 1 > O,i.e. profits decrease 
as the price decreases. Thus, firm A would opt.imally set PA = 0.5p. But this 
cannot be a profitable deviation as it has been demonst.rated above. Thus, 
firm A cannot gain by lmvering its price. 
Consider, next, that firm A deviates by raising its price together with 
some rebate and advertising effort. Profits from such a deviation are given 
by 
n A = PA(l- A) (1 - (PA - p)/8) + PAA (1 - (PA - 0.5p)/8) + 
(16) 
From the first order condition UnA/UrA = 0, we get that firm A would opti-
mally set (PA -TA) = O.5p. Using this, the first order condition onA/oAA = 0 
reduces to p2 /48 = k' (AA). Again, firm A would optimally choose AA = A. It 
can be checked that UnA/UPA = (p(l + A) - 2PA)/8 < 0, i.e. profits decrease 
as the price charged increases. As a result, firm A cannot gain by raising its 
price. The proof is now complete .• 
?TOof of pToposition 2: The proof is analogous to t.he proof of proposition 
1. Assume, for the moment, that consumers believe that the price charged 
at the distant location is not lower than the price charged at their home 
location, i.e. p~ ~ Pj; also that Pi ~ pj - Tj, i,j = A, B. We will later show 
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that these assumptions are satisfied in equilibrium. Firm A's maximization 
problem can then be written as (firm B's decision problem is analogous): 
+(PA - 1'A))'A(PB - (PA -1'A))/S - k().A)] (17) 
First order conditions are given by the following three equations: 
1- ).B(2pA - (p~ - 1'B))ls + ).A(PB - 2(PA - 1'A))/s = a (18) 
-).A(PB - PA - PA + 21'.1)/8 = a (19) 
(PA - TA)(PB - (P~4 - 1'.1))/8 - k'().A) = a (20) 
Imposing symmetry and using rational expectations we obtain the system 
of equations (6)-(8). Note that all the assumptions made above are satisfied. 
Next, we show that the system of equations (6)-(8) has a unique interior 
solution if and only if k'(I) > s/4 and k'(8/V) < v 2 /4s. Equation (6) defines 
P3().) = si). with p;().) < 0, P3(0) = 00 and Pa(1) = 8 (P'P' curve in Figure 
1). Equation (8) is the same as equation (4) (P2(A) and J{J{ curve in Figure 
1). From Figure 1 it can be checked that P:3(A) and P2(A) intersect at an 
interior point where P ::; v if and only if k'(l) > 8/4 and k'(s/v) < 7i /4s. 
Finally, we show that none of the firms has an incentive to deviate from 
the proposed equilibrium. Assume that firm B uses the equilibrium strategy 
(p, T, A) given by (6)-(8), while seller A deviat.es by choosing a PA i- p. It is 
here crucial to carefully specify the expectations of the consumers located at 
B after seller A's deviation. Consumers at location B not receiving a coupon 
do not observe anything new, thus their expectations remain the same. How-
ever, those consumers receiving a coupon shon1o. change their expectations 
as long as they observe a rebate different than the eqnilibrium one, i.e. 1'A i-
a.sp. In fact, consumers know that. seller A will set his rebate in an optimal 
way for any regular price PA, taking as given consumers expectations, PA' 
From (19), the optimal rebate must satisfy TA = O,S(PA + PA - p). Conduct-
ing a simple thought experiment, consumers are able to infer the regular price 
charged by seller A19. This demonstrates that out of equilibrium expectations 
of those consumers receiving a coupon must be rational, i.e. PA = PA. 
Consider first that firm A deviates by lowering its price such that O.Sp ::; 
PA < p. Profits from such a deviation are given by: 
19 Assume that p = 10 and r = 5 in the equilibrium with CNCPs. Assume, further, 
that consumers at B receive a coupon with rA = 6. If, for instance, they form expectations 
PA = 12, then consumers, using equation (19), can infer that PA must be equal to 10. Thus, 
their expectations cannot be correct. The only beliefs consistent on their information are 
then PA = 11. In fact, (19) implies that PA = 11, thus satisfying PA = PA. 
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(21) 
From our previous argument, PA = PA; hence, the optimal rebate must satisfy 
0.5p = (PA - 1'A). Further, the advertising effort. must satisfy 8ITA/8AA = 
p2/4s - k'(AA) = 0, which implies AA = A. As a result, 8ITA/8PA = 2A(p -
PA)/S> 0, that is, profits decrease as PA decreases. Hence, seller A does not 
gain by such a deviation. 
Suppose next, that firm A deviates by lowering its price such that PA < 
0.5p. Profits are then: 
As above, PA must be equal to PA. Therefore, 1·.'1 must again satisfy O.5p = 
(PA -1'.4). Also, 8ITA/8AA = 0 implies that AA = A. As Cl result, 8ITA/oPA = 
1.5 > o. Therefore, firm A would optimally choose PA = O.op, a deviation 
which has already been shown not to be profitable. 
Finally, consider a deviation where firm A raises its price, PA > p. Profit.s 
are then given by: 
ITA = PA(l - AB) + PAAB (s - (PA - (p~ - 1'B))/S) + 
+(PA - TA)AA(PB - (P~1 - rA))/s - k(AA) (23) 
As before, PA = PA. Note that profits are the same as in t.he case where firm A 
deviates by choosing 0.5 ~ PA < p. Thus, the optimal rebate and advertising 
effort must satisfy 0.5p = (PA - TA) and AA = A and the derivative an4 /OPA 
must equal 2A(p - PA)/S < O. This proves that firm A has no interest in 
raising its price. The proof is now complete .• 
Proof of proposition 3: Let us denote the optimal advertising efforts under 
CCPs, CNCPs and perfect price information as A, X, )..", respectively. First, 
we compare profits under CCPs with those under CNCPs. Using (2)-(4), 
equilibrium profits under CCPs can be written as IT = 5Ak'(A) - k(A). Also, 
using (6)-(8), equilibrium profits under CNCPs arc IT' = 3A'k'(A') - k(A'). 
For the family of cost functions k(A) = 'In)..':', 0: 2:: 3, we have IT' > IT -R 
A'°(30: - 1) > AO(50: - 1) -R 
X/A> ((50: -1)/(30: _1))1/0 (24) 
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From (2)-(4), A must satisfy s = 9A2k'(A). Similarly, from (6)-(8), X must 
satisfy s = 4A,2k'(X). Thus, 
(25) 
This equation relates the optimal efforts under CCPs and CNCPs. For the 
particular family of cost functions, one has A' / A = (9/4)0/(1+0). Then by 
(24), IT' > IT {:} 2.25 > ((Sa - 1)/(3a - 1))(1+0)/0. This inequality is clearly 
satisfied for the case a = 3. Since the right hand of the inequality is decreasing 
in a, it can be checked that IT' > IT for all a ~ 3. 
Second, we compare profits under CCPs and under perfect price informa-
tion. The latter are given by IT/I = (4 + )../I)k'(),,") - k()../I) (see Bester and 
Petrakis (1996)). By using a similar procedure as before, and given that X' 
satisfies S = 4(1 + O.SA")2k'()../I) under perfect price information, one obtains 
that IT ;::: IT" if and only if: 
for all a ;::: 3 and 0 < ).. < 1. It is clear tha t in the extreme case A = 1, profits 
under CCPs and under perfect price informat.ion coincide. By plotting the 
left hand side of inequality (26) one can see that it is always positive .• 
Proof of proposition 4: The proof consists of proposing a deviation and 
showing that it is profitable for a firm. Suppose finn A deviates by adopting 
the following strategy: charges PA = O.75p, substitutes all its CNCPs with 
CCPs and offers a rebate rA = O.25p. Profits from a deviation where the 
price charged is lower than p are given by: 
ITA(·) = PA(1- A) + PAA(S - (PA - O.5p))/s+ 
+(PA - 1'A))..A(P - (PA - T';1))/S - k()..A) (27) 
Substituting the deviating strategy (PA, TA, AA) = (O.75p, O.25p, A) in (27) 
and taking into account that the advertising effort takes place through CCPs 
instead of CNCPs, we obtain that ITA = O.75p + O.2S)"k'()..) - k()"). It is 
clear that ITA > IT = P - Ak'(A) - k(A) because P = 4Ak'(A) (from equations 
(6)-(8)) .• 
Proof of proposition 5: Let firm B follow the equilibrium strategy (p, 1', )..). 
Assume that firm A deviates by sending out both CNCPs and CCPs. We 
allow for a quite flexible deviation: CNCPs and CCPs intensities will be 
denoted by lA and AA, respectively. Rebates offered by CNCPs and CCPs 
will be denoted by r A and 1'.1. Consider first a deviation where firm A raises 
its price. Profits are then given by: 
ITA = PA(l - )..)(1 - (PA - p)/s) + PA)..(l - (PA - O.Sp)/s)+ 
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+AA(PA -r A)(P-(PA -r A))/8+, A (PA -r~)(p- (PA -r~))/8-k(AA+' A) (28) 
In the optimal deviation, it must be the case that BIIA/Br A = O. Therefore, 
PA - r A = O.5p. Analogously, it. must. also be t.hat. BIIA/Br~ = O. Hence, 
r~ = O.5(PA + PA - p). Using these equalities, profit.s from raising t.he price 
reduce to: 
IIA = PA(1 - A)(1 - (PA - p)/8) + PAA(1 - (PA - O.5p)/8)+ 
+AAp2/48 + IA(P + PA - PA)2/48 - k(AA + lA) 
The first. order condit.ions are: 
[} 2 IIA P , 
- = - - k (A + ,",,' ) = 0 BAA 48 A lA 
(29) 
BIIA (p + PA - P~1)2 _ ""(AA + ~(A) = 0 (31) 
B'A 48 
BIIA = 1 _ (1 _ A) (2PA - p) _ A (2pA - O.5p) + (p + PA - PA) = 0 (32) 
BPA s "8 lA 2"8 
The same argument as in proposition 2 shows that the only consistent out of 
equilibrium expectations for the consumers at locatioll B receiving a CNCP 
are PA = PA' Using this, it can be checked from (30) and (31) that AA +,A = 
A. Further, note from (32) that the marginal revenue from a CNCP is positive, 
\vhile the marginal revenue from a CCP is zero. Hence, the best for firm A 
is to issue only CNCPs, i.e. lA = A and AA = O. Then from equatioll (32), 
we get PA = O.5(p + s) and optimal profits given by (29) can be reduced to 
IIA = 0.25(p+8)(p(1- A) +8)/8 - Ak' (A) - k(A). These profits are higher than 
equilibrium profits whenever O.25(p + 8)(p(1 - A) + 8)/8 > p. Rearranging 
and using (2), the latter expression is equivalent to 3A2 - 16A + 4 > O. Then 
seller A's profits from the deviation are higher when A < 0.262965. However, 
given PA = O.5(p + s) and (2)-(4), PA > P if and only if A > 2/3 > 0.262965. 
Therefore, seller A cannot increase its profits by raising its price and sending 
out CNCPs as well. 
Consider next a deviat.ion where firm A lowers its price. Assume that 
O.5p ::; PA < p. Profits from such a deviation are given by: 
(33) 
Clearly, BIIA/B1'A = 0 implies PA -1'A = 0.5p. Further, BIIA/B1'~ = 0 implies 
that 7>~ = O.5(PA + PA - p). Again, PA = PA. Therefore, it must be the 
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case that PA - r~ = 0.5p. Thus, the derivative 8ITA/8PA reduces to 1 -
2A(PA - 0.5p)/s + 0.5"1AP/S, which is larger than 0 for all "lA and PA (as 
1 - 2A(PA - 0.5p)/s > 0). Thus, profits decrease in PA and hence firm A 
cannot increase its profits by such a deviation. Assume now that PA ::::; 0.5p. 
Then, profits are given by 
ITA = PA + AA(PA - r A)(P - (PA - r A))/S 
+"IA(PA - r~)(p - (p~ - r~))/s - k(AA + "lA) (34) 
As before it must be that PA - 1'A = 0.5p and PA - 1'~ = O.Sp. Then, the 
derivative 8ITA/8pA = 1 + 0.5"1 AP/S > 0 for all "lA' Thus, profit.s decrease in 
PA, hence firm A cannot gain by lowering its price and sending out CNCPs. 
The proof is now complete .• 
Proof of proposition 6: It only remains to prove that. profits are decreasing 
in m. For k(A) = mAQ, a ~ 3, the equilibrium advert.ising intensity is 
A = (s/9am) (1/l+Q). Profits then reduce to IT = ml/Q+l(Sa - 1)(s/9a)Q/n+l. 
It can be checked that this function is increasing in 1n .• 
Proof of proposition 7: It only remains to prove that social welfare is 
decreasing in m. For k(A) = mAn, a ~ 3, social welfare reduces to SlV = 
2v - 2m(s/9mn)(Q/l+Q) (using the optimal A). It can be checked that this 
function is decreasing in 1n" • 
23 
References 
[1] Banerjee, A., and L. Summers: "On Frequent Flyer Programs and other 
Loyalty-inducing Arrangements", H.LE.H.., D.P. no 1337, 1987. 
[2] Bester, H. and E. Petrakis: "Price Competition and Advertising III 
Oligopoly", European Economic Review, :39, pp. 1075-1088, 1995. 
[3] Bester, H. and E. Petrakis: "Coupons and Oligopolistic Discrimination", 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, pp. 227-42, 1996. 
[4J Butters, G.: "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising 
Prices", Review of Economic Studies 44, pp. 465-491, 1977. 
[5J Caminal, R.: "Price Advertising and Conpons in a Monopoly Model", 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 44, pp. 3~3-52, 1996. 
[6] Caminal, R. and C. Matutes: "Endogenous Switching Costs in a 
Duopoly Model", International Journal of Industr'ial Organization 8, 
pp. 353-373, 1990. 
[7J d'Aspremont, C., J. J. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse: "On Hotelling 
Stability in Competition", Economclrico' 47, pp. 1145-1150, 1979. 
[8J Gerstner, E. and J. Hess: "A Theory of Channel Price Promotions", 
American Economic Review 81, pp. 872-88G, 1991. 
[9J Grossman, G. M. and C. Shapiro: '"Informative Advert.ising wit h Dif-
ferentiated Products", Review of Eco1Lmnic Studies 51, pp. 63-81, 1984. 
[10J Narasimhan, C.: "A Price Discrimination Theory of Coupons", Mm'/,;et-
ing Science 3, pp. 128-147, 1984. 
[11] Narasimhan, C.: "Competit.ive Promot.ional St.rategies", Journal of 
Business 61, pp. 427-449, 1988. 
[12] Peters, M.: "Restrictions on Price Advertising", Journal of Political 
Economy 92, pp. 472-485, 1984. 
[13] Shaked, A. and J. Sutton: '"Relaxing Price Competit.ion Through Prod-
uct Differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, pp. 3-13, 1982. 
[14] Shilony, Y.: "Mixed Pricing in Oligopoly", J OUT'1W,l of Economic Theory 
14, pp. 373-388, 1977. 
24 
[15] Stahl, D.O.: "Oligopolistic Pricing and Advertising", Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 64, pp. 162-177, 1994. 
[16] Stegeman, M.: "Advertising in Competitive Markets", American Eco-
nomic Review 81, pp. 210-223, 1991. 
[17] Strazewski, L: "Jostling for consumers', Marketers' Attention", Adver-
tising Age, 6, 1986. 
[18] Tirole, J.: The Theo'r1.J of Industrial Organization. The MIT Press. 1989. 









: ~1--~~~2:==~~~~~ ______ ~p:; 
25 - - .., - - pili 
3 I I 
K 
25 s 
3v v 1 
FIGURE 1 
